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Introduction: History and Development
of the Court in National Society
The Canadian Supreme Court
by ProfessorPeter H. Russell*
M AY I SAY how pleased I am to have been invited to take part in
these proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute. Like
so many other Canadians I have benefitted greatly over the years from
the study of American laws and institutions. This is particularly true for
those of us who study Supreme Courts. For I think I can safely say, as a
foreign observer viewing the United States Supreme Court from the perspective of political science, that it has been the most powerful court in
the history of the world. Indeed as a close neighbour my main complaint
about your Supreme Court is that so dazzling is its light that we in Canada are too often blinded to the significant and distinctive features of
our own Supreme Court. So, I am happy to be part of this meeting in
which, for a change, the comparative viewing of Supreme Courts will not
be all one way and some of you from your Roman heights may look out at
and learn about the highest court of a nearby province.
My introduction to the Supreme Court of Canada and its historical
development will be divided into three parts: first, what the Court does
- its role in our system of law and government; second, how it does it some distinctive features of its procedures; and finally, who does it - its
judges and questions concerning their mode of appointment.
The central point to grasp about the role of the Supreme Court of
Canada is that it was not established as a branch of government. In fact
the Supreme Court was not established by our Constitution, the British
North America (B.N.A.) Act of 1867. Section 101 of that Act simply empowered the federal parliament to establish, if and when it cared to, a
General Court of Appeal. The scheme of government designed for the
new Dominion was essentially parliamentary. Federalism was adopted as
a necessary expedient principally to accommodate Quebec and was not
expected to generate constitutional litigation. On the contrary, Sir John
A. MacDonald declared optimistically that the division of powers in the
new constitution had been so well drafted that "we have avoided all conflict of jurisdiction and authority." 1 Aside from federalism the prime constitutional checks on the sovereignty of parliament were to be imperial
and monarchical: the powers of reservation and disallowance vested in
the Governor-General and the Queen in Council over the government of
Canada and in the federally appointed Lieutenant Governors and the
*
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Governor General in Council over provincial governments.
The founding of the Supreme Court in 1875 entailed no departure
from this scheme.2 Its principal function was that of an appellate tribunal
with broad powers of review over provincial courts in both civil and criminal matters. Its original jurisdiction was limited to a concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus (for the convenience of Ottawa residents). Nothing could better illustrate its subordinate role in Canadian
government than the section of the Supreme Court Act which empowered
the Governor in Council (i.e. the federal cabinet) to
elicit advisory opin3'
ions from the Court "on any matters whatsoever."
This new general court of appeal, established by an ordinary act of
the federal parliament in 1875, did not at that time become Canada's
final court of appeal. Until 1949, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council remained the highest court to which Canadian litigants could resort. This had not been the intention of the Liberal administration which
introduced the Supreme Court Act in 1875, although it was very much
the desire of Sir John A. MacDonald's Conservatives who were the architects of the original Supreme Court bills and who held power federally
through most of Canada's first three decades. Faulty draftmanship and
the British colonial office's determination to retain the judicial link
amongst the diminishing imperial ties resulted in the continuation of the
Canadian's right to seek leave to appeal to the foot of the throne. Thus,
the Supreme Court of Canada for its first three-quarters of a century was
an intermediate general court of appeal in the sense that its own decisions could be appealed to the Privy Council and that its jurisdiction
could be completely by-passed by the litigant who chose to appeal directly to the Privy Council from the court of last resort in a province.
How has it functioned in practice? Has the Supreme Court kept to
the modest role originally envisaged for it? The answer to this is yes, it
has performed more or less as originally planned, but not exactly. The
principal changes and developments have come in the last thirty years
since the abolition of the Privy Council appeal in 1949.
From 1875 to 1949 most of the cases heard by the Supreme Court
concerned private law. Tort, contract and real property were the branches
of law most frequently dealt with by the Court. In the domain of public
law, the Supreme Court considered questions relating to the powers of
municipalities more often than taxation, criminal or constitutional law.4
The Supreme Court's opinions in these cases were on the whole of little
consequence in shaping Canadian law. The Court had little power to select the cases it heard. In civil cases there was an appeal as of right from
I See, F. Underhill, Edward Blake, the Supreme Court and the Appeal to the Privy
Council, CAN. HisT. REV., vol. XIX, 245 (1938); F. McKinnon, The Establishment of the
Supreme Court of Canada, CAN. HiST. REV., vol. XXVI, 260 (1946).
3 38

Vic., c.11, s.52.

See P. Russell, The PoliticalRole of the Supreme Court of Canada in its First Century, CAN. B. REV., Vol. LIII, 576 (1975).
4
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the provincial court of last resort limited only by the sum of money in
dispute. 5 In criminal cases there was an appeal as of right on questions of
law in cases involving indictable offences where a difference had occurred
amongst the judges of the provincial courts.' In addition, of course, the
appeal to the Judicial Committee and the colonial cast of Canadian jurisprudence meant that the judges of the Supreme Court were extremely
deferential to the decisions of English courts.
The fact that most of the Supreme Court's work concerned matters
of private law should have meant, at least theoretically, that the Court
would have a unifying effect on Canadian law. The B.N.A. Act assigns
jurisdiction over "property and civil rights" to the provincial legislatures
and this phrase was given a very wide interpretation by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in interpretation by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in interpreting the Constitution. Thus the Supreme
Court's rulings on provincial law could be a centralizing force off-setting
the decentralizing consequences of constitutional interpretations.
Certainly this feature of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, in the
early years, attracted stiff opposition from Quebec. Quebec's system of
civil law stood, along with religion and language, as one of the three pillars of the distinctive culture the preservation of which was a key rationale for granting sovereign powers to provincial legislatures. Although
Quebeckers acquiesced in the final power of the Imperial Privy Council to
interpret its laws, many of them bitterly resented the prospect of a Court
dominated by English Canadians trained in the common law overruling
the decisions of Quebec judges on Quebec's Civil Code and Code of Procedure. There were attempts to terminate appeals to the Supreme Court in
provincial law matters or at least to ensure that a majority of judges
trained in civil law heard appeals concerning Quebec's distinctive laws.
These efforts were not successful.7 Nor did the Supreme Court issue any
self-denying ordinance along the lines of Erie v. Tompkins" and defer to
the decisions of the higl~st provincial court in provincial law matters. In
this respect the Supreme Court's practice reflects the remarkably unitary
nature of the Canadian judicial system in which the judges of the provincial superior, county and district courts are federally appointed and provincial courts have jurisdiction in nearly all areas of federal and provincial law.
The amount required was gradually raised. It became $10,000 in 1956 and remained
at that level until the abolition of the right of appeal in civil cases in 1975.
' The right of appeal in criminal cases is governed by the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Code gives a person convicted of an indictable offence the right to appeal from a provincial appeal court's decision confirming his conviction, providing that decision was not

unanimous and from a provincial appeal court's decision setting aside an acquittal. The
Attorney General has a right of appeal in converse circumstances.
See, P. RUSSELL,
INSTITUTION (1969).

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AS A BILINGUAL AND BICULTURAL

8 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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But, as I have suggested, the unifying influence of the Supreme Court
may have been more theoretical than real. The colonial mentality of its
judges and the Court's intermediate status much reduced the possibility
of judicial creativity. In Quebec civil law appeals there were certainly decisions, for instance some relating to the rights of parents or the precepts
of the rule of law limiting public authority, in which the non-Quebec majority of the Supreme Court read their own social and legal values into
Quebec's civil law. But these are not easy to find. My own belief is that
the groundwork for the Anglicization of French civil law in Quebec had
been established before 1867 through the influence of several generations
of English judges who controlled the judicial system of Quebec in the century following the English conquest.9
Turning now to constitutional law - the field in which one expects
to find the most dramatic exercise of judicial power in the work of a Supreme Court - the Court's role has expanded beyond original expectations. The path here was blazed by the Judicial Committee which in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries assumed the task of umpiring
the Canadian Constitution. The Fathers of Confederation like MacDonald had not thought that Canadian federalism would require a lot of adjudication. Even less did they expect that the English Law Lords would
find the B.N.A. Act provided for classical federalism with a finely balanced division of powers between sovereign legislatures. The Supreme
Court of Canada as an intermediate appeal court soon suppressed the nationalism of its founding members and fell into line with the Privy Council's jurisprudence.
As a result of these developments, judge-made constitutional law became an enduring influence on the balance of power within Canadian federalism. Judicial interpretation of the Constitution has provided the legal
foundation for a much less centralized federation than that envisaged by
the governing alliance at the time of Confederation, although it may well
be a system more in accord with the social and political fabric of the
country.
When the Supreme Court became Canada's final court of appeal in
1949, popular political attention naturally focused on its role as constitutional arbiter. It is in this capacity that the Court has the greatest potential for becoming truly a branch of government. Until quite recently, the
Supreme Court's performance in adjudicating federal disputes was not remarkable. The Court continued to hear a thin trickle of constitutional
cases - two to three per year. Most of the action in shaping and adjusting the federal system occurred in the executive arena through negotiated
agreements between the two levels of government. A few of the Court's
early decisions expounded expansive constructions of the key federal
powers of peace order and good government and trade and commerce.
' For evidence to support this view see, L. Baudouin, Conflits nes de la coexistence
juridique au Canada, in LA DuALiTE

CANADIENNE,

(Mason Wade ed., 1960).
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Until 1977, none of its post-1949 decisions had ruled the exercise of federal power ultra vires. On the other hand, in a significant number of cases
the Court dismissed challenges to provincial initiatives which appeared to
encroach on fields traditionally reserved for the federal parliament.
Since 1975 a minor revolution has occurred in this aspect of the Supreme Court's work. The thin trickle of constitutional cases has become a
veritable flood - four reported in 1975 and again in 1976, six in 1977 and
last year - eleven. 10 Some of these decisions have overruled provincial
laws notably in the fields of communication and resource management.'
These decisions have been the subject of loud provincial protests. Much
less' acclaimed have been the Court's decisions in these same years restricting federal power and expanding provincial power especially in the
field of criminal law.' 2 The Supreme Court appears to me to have maintained a reasonably balanced approach to federalism.
But much more important than how the Court appears to me is how
it appears to the country. An important implication of the quantitative
leap in constitutional litigation may be the diminishing capacity of executive federalism to reach negotiated accommodations. If this is so and Canada is to rely much more on its Supreme Court to settle disputes about
the division of powers, then the authority which the Court has in the eyes
of the people and politicians to play such a role will be of great importance. I am not as confident as I would like to be that the Court commands the respect which is a political prerequisite for that authority.
Some Canadians - more accurately some law professors and law students and a few federal politicians - have yearned for a different type of
Supreme Court in the field of constitutional law and indeed for a different kind of constitution. They have been "thrilled" - and I choose that
word carefully - by the modern spectacle of the United States Supreme
Court applying the abstract phrases of a constitutional Bill of Rights to
the acts of state and national governments." They denounce the Supreme
Court for its cautious interpretation of the statutory Bill of Rights which
John Diefenbaker gave the country in 1960. Many who expound such
views strike me as terribly uncritical of American experience and
10 These figures refer to reported decisions in which the interpretation of the B.N.A.
Act was a necessary part of the Supreme Court's decision. Cases dealing with the Bill of

Rights are not included as it is an ordinary federal statute and, in that sense, not part of
Canada's Constitution.
11 See Amax Potash Ltd., et al. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576;
Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545;
Capital Cities Communications Inc., et al. v. C.R.T.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141; Public Service
Board v. Dionne and A.-G. Canada, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191; A.-G. Quebec v. Kellogg Co. et al.,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 211; Central Canada Potash and A.-G. Canada v. The Government of Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42.
12 See MacDonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134; Quebec North
Shore Paper v. C.P. Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 662; A.-G. Canada and Dupond v. Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770.
11 See P. TRUDEAU, A CANADIAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1968).
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unimaginative about alternative means of balancing the requirements of
freedom and order or overcoming discrimination in Canada. I believe that
federalism strictly interpreted can be a tremendous source of liberty. I
would also observe that before the enactment of the Canadian Bill of
Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada was well on the way to finding in
the B.N.A. Act's provisions for parliamentary government a constitutional basis for fundamental political freedoms.
Finally, I should draw attention to one further recent change in what
the Supreme Court does. Since 1949, public law matters have replaced
private law matters as the dominant element in the Court's case load.
Criminal law and taxation cases now outnumber tort, contract and real
property cases. This trend has been accelerated by a very important
change in the Court's jurisdiction. In 1975, the right of appeal in civil
cases involving $10,000 or more was abolished.' The Court now selects
the civil cases it hears and the statute instructs it to choose cases according to the importance of the legal issue in dispute. This development coincides with the establishment and rapid growth of the Federal Court of
Canada which in 1970 took over the jurisdiction of the only federal court
of original jurisdiction, the Exchequer Court (confined mainly to claims
against the federal treasury and patent cases) as well as the jurisdiction
of the provinces' superior courts in federal administrative law. This
created an expanded federal trial court with an appeal division, moving
Canada one step closer to the American system of dual courts. Coupled
with the 1975 jurisdictional change it will likely shift the Supreme Court's
role to one which is principally concerned with the interpretation of federal statutes and the adjudication of citizen claims against federal administrative organs. This is a role which provides plenty of scope for judicial
statesmanship in balancing the requirements of efficiency against those of
due process.
Let me turn now to the Court's modus operandi.American observers
would find the working methods and procedures of the Canadian Supreme Court considerably more individualistic and British than those of
the United States Supreme Court. The Chief Justice's role in managing
the work of the Court and the systematic use of conferences to sort out
issues and assign opinion-writing responsibility have been much less developed in Canada. Too often Canadian lawyers could only ascertain the
ratio of a decision by piecing together the reasons given by several judges
on the majority side. However, there has been some change over the past
decade or so. Conferences are now more frequent; seriatim opinion-writing has declined.
Further changes of this kind will be forced upon the Court by pressure of a growing case-load. Radical individualism is a luxury which only
underworked appealscourts can afford. While the volume of reported decisions continues at about 100 per annum, the great pressure, as with the
" STATUTES OF CANADA,

1974-75-76, c.18.
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United States Supreme Court, comes from applications for leave to appeal. Since 1975 the Court's responsibility for being its own gate-keeper
has greatly increased. Motions for leave are heard by the Court sitting in
panels of three. This method of selecting cases may prove to be too timeconsuming as an ever more litigious population seeks justice from the
highest court in the land. Also, the fact that the system gives one third of
the Court's judges the power to prevent a case from being heard may
become unacceptable as greater awareness develops of the discretionary
character of the leave-granting process. Still Canada, with one-tenth the
population, has a long way to go before it faces the challenge to judicial
engineering which confronts the United States in maintaining a small collegial court of nine judges for the selection and final adjudication of those
legal issues which are most in need of resolution for the whole nation.
One factor which has made it easier for our Supreme Court to handle
a larger case load is its practice of sitting most often with less than a full
court. Most appeals since the Court's beginning have been heard by a
panel of five judges. Although, once again, times are changing; Chief Justice Laskin has expressed his determination to have all nine judges hear
the most important cases especially those involving constitutional law.
The most recently obtainable statistics indicate that he is having his way
in this regard. 15 As the legislative significance of the Court's decisions
comes to be more widely acknowledged, there should be less tolerance for
having cases decided by panels which do not contain all the shades of
legal and social philosophy amongst the Court's membership.
Another noticeable procedural difference between the Canadian and
American Supreme Courts is the continued importance of oral argument
in Canada's Supreme Court. Written factums setting forth the arguments
have always been submitted. The Court's willingness in the recent AntiInflation Reference case' at least to accept for consideration material
prepared by social scientists on the practical implications of challenged
legislation may encourage more American style Brandeis briefs. Since the
late 1960's all of the Justices have acquired law clerks to assist them in
mining the written materials. But despite these changes the Court at
work still bears more resemblance to an adversarial arena than to a research institute. Presentation of arguments in open court without time
limit and with plenty of opportunity for questions from the bench remains a hallmark of Supreme Court practice.
The emphasis on oral argument adversely affects French-speaking
counsel. The only feature of the Supreme Court which is guaranteed by
the Canadian Constitution is the right to use English and French in its
proceedings. 17 While the right is clearly there in law, in practice the Court
,5 StatisticalAnalysis of [1976] S.C.R., OSGOODE HALL L.J., vol. XIV, 695 (1978). However, it should be noted that there is still some way to go: in 1976 only 5 judges sat in 70 of
the 94 cases reported.
Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373.
Section 133 of the B.N.A. Act provides that French or English may be used in the
federal and Quebec legislatures and the federal and Quebec courts.
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has not been fully bilingual. In part this is simply a consequence of the
fact that unilingual English-speaking judges have always been in the majority and most of the French-speaking judges have been fluently bilingual. But this hardly explains the shameful fact that the Court's official
reports until the 1960's did not provide translations of many of the
Court's opinions. Not until the 1960's were facilities for the simultaneous
translation of oral arguments introduced. Up until then a French-speaking lawyer who wished to argue in his mother tongue faced the very real
risk that most of the judges could not follow him. In a Court where oral
argument plays such a significant role in decision-making this was a grave
handicap. In recent years English-speaking judges have made great efforts
to develop their proficiency in French. Still, recent observations in the
Court and interviews with French-speaking lawyers indicate that the
Court has some way to go before it can claim to be truly bilingual.
It is worthwhile returning to one earlier point about procedure - the
reference case. Earlier I pointed out that the Supreme Court Act empowered the federal government to refer questions to the Supreme Court for
advisory opinions on any matter whatsoever. Since 1875 the reference
case has blossomed into a distinctive Canadian institution. All of the
provinces have adopted similar provisions for referring questions to their
highest courts of appeal. In theory judicial answers to reference questions
are only advisory. But in practice, with few exceptions, reference case decisions have been treated as regular judicial decisions. As a result, many
of the Supreme Court's most important constitutional decisions have
been rendered not in settling a case or controversy in the sense required
by U.S. practice but in answering rather abstract (and sometimes hypothetical) questions put to it by government without any reference to particular fact situations."s I have always been intrigued by this process
which enablea leaders of the political branch of government to turn on
the tap of judicial review whenever they wish. I doubt that it would have
been tolerated had there been from the beginning in Canada a stronger
sense of thb Court as a separate branch of government.
A more criticized feature of Supreme Court practice has been the
9
Court's self-imposed rule of stare decisis.1
Since 1949 there have been
declarations of independence from previous decisions of the Judicial
Committee. But it was not until the Court's decision in Paquette in
19760 that the Court openly overruled one of its own previous decisions.
The importance of this development is apt to be overrated. The Court
has frequently distinguished or ignored previous decisions. The evolution
of its constitutional jurisprudence since 1949 demonstrates flexibility
more often than rigidity.
" For a discussion of the reference case see, G. Rubin, The Nature, Use and Effect of
Reference Cases in Canadian ConstitutionalLaw, McGILL L.J., vol. VI, 168 (1959-60).
" See MacGuigan, Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court of Canada, CAN. B.
REv., vol. XLV, 627 (1967).

10 R. v. Paquette, 70 D.L.R. 3d 129 (1976).
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Perhaps a more telling criticism - although this depends much on
the view one takes of the function of the decisions of a nation's highest
court on second appeal - is the manner in which judges have written
their opinions. Often opinions have failed to provide statements of the
fundamental principles underlying the legal doctrines and precedents on
which a decision turns.21 This, I think, is a more serious charge than the
Court's alleged lack of "activism". The Court has frequently rendered decisions that impose its own view of what the law requires on other
branches of government. But most of its judges have adhered to a formalistic style of opinion-writing. As a result it has often failed to acknowledge its inescapable legislative role and provide persuasive reasons for its
legislative contributions. Compared with the highest courts of Great Britain, Australia and the United States, the universal value of its contributions to legal reasoning have been unimpressive.
Let me turn now to the dramatispersonae - the justices of the Supreme Court. The size of the Court has changed three times. Originally it
was a six judge Court. A seventh justice was added in 1927. In 1949, when
the Court became Canada's final court of appeal, it became a nine judge
court. The Chief Justice and the eight ordinary or puisne judges are appointed by the Governor-in-Council (i.e. the federal cabinet). In practice
the choice would be basically the Prime Minister's with advice from the
Minister of Justice. 22 There is no ratification of the choice by any legislative or other body. To be eligible for appointment a person must have
practiced law for ten years or else have served as a judge of a superior
court. The judges hold office during good behaviour and can be removed
only by the Governor General on address of both Houses of Parliament.
Judges must retire on reaching the age of seventy-five.
So much for the dry legal facts. Who in fact is appointed and why?
The most remarkable feature of Supreme Court appointments is the observance of regional quotas. There is only one statutory requirement for
provincial representation and that is that three of the nine justices must
come from the bar or bench of Quebec. Before 1949 the Supreme Court
Act required that two of the seven justices, and before 1927, two of the
six justices come from Quebec. This provision has been a concession to
the need for qualified judges to hear cases involving Quebec's civil law. Of
course it is only a token concession as until 1949 the Quebec justices were
always a minority even in civil law appeals and since 1949 they are at
best, but not always, three-fifths of the panel on a civil law appeal from
Quebec. By virtue of custom rather than statute the other regions must
also be represented. It is an iron law of Canadian politics that Ontario
must always have as much if not more than Quebec. The requirements of
this rule have been met except for two occasions. The first occasion was
2 This theme is most cogently developed in P. WEILER, IN THE LAST RESORT (1974).
2 See Ratushny, Judicial Appointments: The Lang Legacy, in THE CANADIAN JUDICiARY, (A.M. Linden ed. 1976).
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from 1903 to 1905 when the Ontario representation was lowered to one to
make room for the first western judge and the second occurred last year
when a place vacated by a retiring Ontario justice was filled by Mr. Justice MacIntyre from British Columbia, lowering the Ontario quota from
three to two for the first time since 1949. The few places left over after
Quebec and Ontario have taken their shares have been divided between
the Atlantic and Western provinces, with the Western provinces getting
the lion's share, two since 1927 and now three with Justice MacIntyre's
appointment.
This regional pattern of appointments has little if anything to do
with the functional needs of the Court. In the future, as the Court takes
fewer cases in provincial law matters, any lingering functional rationale
will be further diminished. The practice is of course a reflection of the
sectionalism characteristic of Canadian political life. We could learn
much about our two societies (although I suspect not much about our two
Supreme Courts) by exploring why regional representation has been so
essential for the Canadian Supreme Court while racial, ethnic and religious representation has been more important for the American Supreme
Court.
In recent years the tendency to fill vacancies by promoting judges
from the provinces' superior courts rather than appointing lawyers from
private practice has increased. Another change is that fewer ex-politicians are to be found amongst Supreme Court appointees. Nearly half of
the first fifty judges appointed had at one time or another been elected
politicians at the provincial or federal levels, whereas only one of the
judges appointed after 1949 has had this experience. As the Court moves
into an era when its work deals more than ever with public law issues,
this lack of political experience amongst its members may prove to be
something of a handicap. I think it less of a handicap that in terms of
economic and ethnic background, and sex the Court has consistently
failed to mirror the Canadian population. As John Porter has well shown
in these social and biological terms the Court represents Canada's governing elite.2 3 Given the composition of the legal profession from which
Supreme Court justices must come, this has not unduly restricted recruitment. Nor do I think the capacity for rendering reasoned and lawful justice depends on having the same social background as those to whom one
is rendering justice. Nevertheless, symbolically the complete absence of
women and the under-representation of religious and ethnic minorities
may weaken the Court's authority in an age when these things have become so important.
It is at the level of political symbolism that the Supreme Court is
now before the country as a matter of constitutional reform. There is, I
think a consensus amongst federal and provincial politicians that the
Court appears to be too much a creature of the federal government. A
23

J.

PORTER, THE VERTICAL MOSAIC

(1965).
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Court which has the potential of playing such a crucial role, in settling
disputes between the two levels of government should be established by
the Constitution and not by an Act of the federal parliament. Also there
should be some provincial participation in the appointment of judges
whether through ratification by a federal Senate transformed into a
House of the Provinces or directly through the approval of provincial governments. I emphasize that the need for this is essentially symbolic.2 4 It is
foolish to think that there is a distinctive provincial or regional view on
the legal subjects, including constitutional law, which constitute the
Court's docket. It is worse than foolish to think that members of the
Court should act as regional representatives. 5
But there is a need for a Supreme Court that is respected by the
leading politicians and the critically active public in all parts of the country. This need will become more acute if, as I think is likely, the Court is
increasingly called upon to settle constitutional disputes arousing hot political passions. For this role it must become a separate branch of government with its own non-partisan political constituency of sufficient
strength to withstand the assaults of warring politicians.
24 Recent proposals to amend the constitutional provisions relating to the Supreme
Court of Canada would give the Supreme Court a constitutional basis and involve the provinces in the appointment of Supreme Court justices. See The Constitutional Amendment
Bill (1978).
25 Chief Justice Laskin's Address to the Seminar for Journalists (Ottawa, February 22,
1978) criticizes those in Canada who assume that Supreme Court justices should represent
regional or governmental interests.

